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Abstract. In the last decade, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are proliferated in many domains in-
cluding critical infrastructures such as energy, transportation and man-
ufacturing. Consequently, most of the daily operations now rely on the
data coming from wireless sensors or IoT devices and their actions. In
addition, personal IoT devices are heavily used for social media applica-
tions, which connect people as well as all critical infrastructures to each
other under the cyber domain. However, this connectedness also comes
with the risk of increasing number of cyber attacks through WSNs and/or
IoT. While a significant research has been dedicated to secure WSN/IoT,
this still indicates that there needs to be forensics mechanisms to be able
to conduct investigations and analysis. In particular, understanding what
has happened after a failure is crucial to many businesses, which rely on
WSN/IoT applications. Therefore, there is a great interest and need for
understanding digital forensics applications in WSN and IoT realms.
This chapter fills this gap by providing an overview and classification of
digital forensics research and applications in these emerging domains in a
comprehensive manner. In addition to analyzing the technical challenges,
the chapter provides a survey of the existing efforts from the device level
to network level while also pointing out future research opportunities.
Keywords: digital forensics, IoT, WSN, security
1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been initially proposed for military op-
erations by the end of 90s (Estrin et al., 1999). However, with their potential in
many applications, they have started to be deployed in different civil applica-
tions in early 2000s. WSNs have been touted to be used in many applications.
These include but is not limited to environmental monitoring, habitat monitor-
ing, structural health monitoring, health applications, agriculture applications
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and surveillance (Xu, 2002). Typically, in such applications, a large number of
sensors are deployed to sense the environment and send the collected data to a
gateway or base-station for further processing. The communication is multi-hop
and all the nodes are assumed to be battery-operated with limited processing
and storage capabilities. There has always been incredible interest in WSN re-
search from node level to application level (Akyildiz et al., 2002). The bulk of
WSN research has focused on energy-efficient protocols at different layers of
the protocol stack. The goal was to maximize the lifetime of the WSNs while
enabling distributed operations. Energy-efficient MAC, routing, and transport
protocols have been proposed (Akkaya and Younis, 2005; Demirkol et al., 2006;
Wang et al., 2006). Later, these protocols were augmented with security capa-
bilities (Walters et al., 2007). Despite the huge amount of research, the WSN
market was not mature. In the early 2000s, there were only a few sensor prod-
ucts (such as Mica2) and standardization efforts were not adequate. Therefore,
the use of term WSN has been diminished and efforts are directed towards more
personal sensor devices that came with the proliferation of smart phones and
other wearable devices. The attention has shifted to these devices, referred to as
Internet of Things (IoT).
The term IoT was first phrased in the context of supply chain management
by Kevin Ashton in 1999 to get executive attention at Procter & Gamble (Ash-
ton, 2009). Although it was used in different and somewhat related concepts
earlier, the definition has become more comprehensive to comprise devices from
health-care to entertainment and transportation to building management (Sund-
maeker et al., 2010). Therefore, the term might be used to describe the world
where other devices are uniquely distinguishable, addressable, and contactable
by means of the Internet. For example smart homes are furnished with hi-tech
devices controlling such devices as the TV, refrigerator, microwave, blinds, music
system, air conditioning units.
Today, we have more than 5 billion “things” connected to the Internet and
this number is expected to be nearly 50 billion (there are also different estimates)
by 2020 (Tillman, 2013). Taking the advantage of using RFID and sensor network
technology, physical objects such as computers, phones, wearable technologies,
home appliances, vehicles, medical devices and industrial systems can be easily
connected, tracked and managed by a single system (Jiang et al., 2014). One of
the many reasons to get these devices connected is that most people all want
to take advantage of being conveniently “online” in this age of Internet. On the
other hand, we do underestimate the down sides of being connected in every
second of every day.
Although the expected number of connected devices is hypothetical, there is
a real issue regarding existence of such a large collection of devices which are
mostly vulnerable to cyberattacks. On October 21, 2016, we faced the reality of
how our innocent household devices connected to the Internet could be part of an
IoT army committing distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) to shut down
websites including Twitter, Netflix, Paypal and Amazon Web services (Williams,
2016). In addition to being vulnerable, Syed Zaeem Hosain, CTO of Aeris - a
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pioneer in the machine-to-machine market, has raised the concern that scalability
in IoT is the biggest issue as such a large number of devices will be generating
enormously big data (Hosain, 2016). Hence, the following questions are asked by
Mr. Hosain:
– How will we transport such large data?
– How will we store it?
– How will we analyze it?
– How will we search/find targeted data in large collection?
– How will we keep the data secure and private?
All of these questions are part of our concerns about IoT today, however it is
urgent that these issues must be addressed in advance before we are faced with
serious scalability issues.
Miorandi et al. have discussed that IoT is a leading technology which brings
various areas from cyber and the physical world together by the means of making
physical devices smarter and connected with one another (Miorandi et al., 2012).
By taking this into account, the usage of the term IoT can be generalized into
the following broad areas as discussed in (Atzori et al., 2010; Pen˜a-Lo´pez, 2005):
– the global network providing ultimate interconnection ability to the smart
things (devices) via the Internet
– the collection of assistive technologies (e.g. RFIDs, Near Field Communica-
tion devices, and WISP.)
– the group of applications and services (e.g. Cloud services and Web of
things.)
Although different terms have similar meaning the popularity of concepts has
changed over the time. Now we look at web search popularity of the terms IoT
(including Internet of Things), WSNs and Ubiquitous Computing (UC) as they
are used interchangeably. Fig. 1(a) is created using Google Trends and it shows
how fast the IoT popularity has increased in web searches compared to the terms
WSNs and UC over the decade. Similarly, Fig. 1(b) shows how the popularity
of the terms WSNs and UC has decreased (comparatively) since 2004.
Whether it is called IoT or WSN, there has been a lot of studies to secure
these networks starting from the node level to network level (Zawoad and Hasan,
2015). The security services provided in IoT and WSN include confidentiality,
integrity, authentication, access control, anonymity and availability.
However, with the increasing prevalence of these devices in many real-life
applications, a need has emerged for conducting digital/network forensics to
be able to understand the reasons for failures and various attacks. Therefore, in
recent years also we have witnessed some studies on cyber-forensics that relate to
WSNs or IoT. The goal of this chapter is to investigate such forensic research on
WSNs and IoT, and put them in a systematic manner for better understanding
and future research.
This chapter is organized as follows: In the Section 2, we provide a brief
background on digital forensics. Section 3 presents related background in IoT
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(a) Search trends for IoT, Wireless Sensor Networks and Ubiquitous Computing
(b) Search trends for Wireless Sensor Networks and Ubiquitous Computing
Fig. 1: Google search trends between January 2004 and December 2016: The
numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for
all world and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value
of 50 means that the term is half as popular. Likewise a score of 0 means the
term was less than 1% as popular as the peak (Google, 2016b).
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and WSNs. Section 4 discusses how digital forensics can be applied to IoT and
WSN environments.
2 Digital Forensics
Digital Forensics is a branch of forensics science particularly targeting identi-
fication, collection (a.k.a. acquisition), examination, analysis, and reporting of
digital evidence in order to present it to a court of law. Fig 2 shows the U.S.
Department of Justice’s digital forensics investigative process described in “A
guide to first responders” (DoJ, 2001). Digital forensics investigators deal with
tremendous amounts of data from numerous types of devices including comput-
ers, phones, wearable devices, industrial controls systems, military deployment
systems.
Fig. 2: Digital Forensics Process Model (Karabiyik, 2015)
When a crime/incident occurs, incident first responders arrive to the scene
to identify and secure the digital devices for forensics soundness (preserving
integrity of evidence). After securing the evidence devices digital forensics in-
vestigators collect digital evidence for further examination and analysis. This
basically means to find crime/incident related data on the digital device such as
finding traces of an attack and its timestamp on memory of hacked smart TV.
During the collection, examination and analysis phases, investigators use digi-
tal forensics tools (both hardware and software). These tools help investigators
to locate and recover digital evidence which can be both inculpatory (evidence
that proves the guilt) and exculpatory (evidence that proves the innocence). At
the reporting phase, investigators prepare a report to include in their testimony.
When the investigator is asked to testify and present the evidence at a court,
the admissibility of the evidence will be questioned based on the procedures fol-
lowed by the investigator. The most important factor for the admissibility is to
verify that the evidence device has not been altered during the investigation. In
the case of the IoT environment, this may be quite challenging as there is no
universal standard to collect, examine and analyze data from IoT.
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Due to the accelerated advancement in technology, particularly in last the two
decades, huge numbers of (heterogeneous) objects became available for personal
or enterprise use. This also yields an enormous amount of heterogeneous data
and thus more sophisticated and more difficult digital forensics investigations.
3 Related Background on IoT and WSNs
The evolutionary background of IoT lies in the advancement of the technology
on micro sensor devices in the later 90s. Specifically, the advancements in micro
processors, memory technology and more importantly micro sensing devices led
to the development of tiny sensors. These sensors are then equipped with radio
communication capability on battery energy which enabled unattended intelli-
gent sensing devices that can gather, process and transmit data. In the early
2000s many sensor devices were built to fit the needs of various applications as
seen in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Various sensor platforms: Arduino, Particle, SUN Spots, IRIS Motes
Of particular interest to these devices are their resources, especially in terms
of memory and storage. Early sensors have very scarce resources in terms of
memory which makes data storage almost impossible for forensics purposes.
Typically, there were two cases where memory was used: 1) User memory used
for storing application-related or personal data; and 2) Program memory used
for programming the device. This memory also contains identification data if the
device has any. Table 1 shows the memory sizes for these devices.
Table 1: Memory size for different platforms
Devices Memory Size
Passive Tags O(100B)
Active Tags O(1kB)
IRIS Motes O(100kB)
Gateways O(100MB)
The other sensor component that is of interest due to forensics would be the
communication module. Early devices relied on energy-aware MAC protocols for
communication (Demirkol et al., 2006). Some of them later became standards
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such as Zigbee (Baronti et al., 2007) but some of them were only adapted such
as Bluetooth (Bluetooth, 2001) as seen in Table 2.
Table 2: MAC protocols and data rates for different sensors
Standard Rate Frequency
Bluetooth 2.1Mb/s 2.4GHz
ZigBee 250kb/s 2.4GHz/918MHz/868MHz
RFM TR 1000 (proprietary) 19.2kb/s 916.5MHz
Chipcon CC 1000 (proprietary) 100kb/s 433MHz
At the network layer, energy-efficient routing protocols were developed to
provide service to large-scale WSNs consisting of thousands of nodes (Werner-
Allen et al., 2006; Szewczyk et al., 2004; Arora et al., 2004) and employ multi-hop
communication (Akkaya and Younis, 2005). Zigbee Alliance had also routing and
application layer protocols for WSNs (Baronti et al., 2007). In most cases, these
protocols were distributed and required sensor nodes to maintain a simple rout-
ing table for data forwarding. In some cases, the routing protocol was managed
by the gateway which is assumed to collect all the sensor data from the sen-
sors. In any case, there was enough information in the sensors or gateway to be
able to identify routing failures in real-time but this might be challenging for
cyberforensics purposes as will be discussed later.
The heavy research on WSNs later led to the development of some standards
such as Zigbee/IEEE802.15.4, IETF ROLL (Ko et al., 2011; Sheng et al., 2013),
IETF 6LoWPAN (Shelby and Bormann, 2011), Wireless HART (Song et al.,
2008), ISA100 (Committee et al., 2009) which accelerated the production of
sensor devices. In the meantime, there has been further developments to enrich
the resources of sensor devices and getting them connected to the Internet. The
enrichment was in terms of processor and memory capacity and the number
of sensing modules. With the proliferation of smart mobile phones, the idea
of smart, connected, sensing and battery-operated devices have penetrated our
everyday lives which has led to the development of similar products to make
our lives convenient. Within a few years, a lot of sensing and communication
capable devices such as smart meters, cameras, thermostats, wearables, RFIDs,
tags, bulbs, beds, speakers, locks, watches, cookers, keypad, and applicances,
have started to be seen which are referred to as IoT devices in general (Devices,
2016).
With the enriched resources, these devices started to look like more of our
laptops with comparable memory/storage sizes and communication capabilities.
In addition to Zigbee or Bluetooth, Wifi/4G has also started to be used for
communication purposes. Finally, the data collected from these devices was not
stored in the gateways but rather transferred to cloud storage where it can be
accessed for later use.
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The IoT era changed the needs of the WSN era and Digital Forensics was one
of the affected area as the devices are being used in a lot of daily applications
by humans. Therefore, we discuss how digital forensics is applied to the IoT and
WSNs.
4 Applying Digital Forensics to IoT and WSNs
IoT and WSNs consist of sensitive data stored and processed hence, in theory
it is suggested that the data which is processed and cumulated by well known
firms will be the subject of future digital forensic investigations. The evidence
that is provided by IoT or WSNs to the forensic community will be far more
finer compared to what the community currently possesses. In addition, IoT and
WSNs also offer new and better opportunities for data that is at times misused,
through growth and development in the forensic community’s procedures. The
techniques/algorithms methods that were used and or developed were based on
the digital forensics process model consisting of collection, examination, analy-
sis, and reporting of the data/evidence. Using these practices not only data for
evidence is identified in a myriad system, but is also preserved for future refer-
ences as the information presented is an intense fusion of collection, extraction,
processing, and interpretations.
Digital forensics in IoT/WSNs is a challenge especially when it comes to
accuracy due to the intensity of analysis. This results in data sometimes losing
its granularity as systems may store, use, or present different semantics however,
it does have the ability to adopt dissimilar formats, and may hold a proprietary
format. Taking into the heterogeneity of data that IoT/WSNs devices generate
it is even more challenging. The following questions must be answered before the
investigation is being performed in order to avoid inadmissibility of evidence. Can
data be collected from the devices using available tools? Is the data propriety?
How can it be analyzed? Are forensic tools compatible with this data?
Most of the challenges in IoT forensics are also available to the WSNs par-
ticularly at the device/data storage and network levels. The only difference in
most cases is the scale of WSNs because of the application-specific needs. Early
WSNs works lacked any security in regards to integrity and authentication be-
cause of the broadcast nature of communication. There was no formal set of
requirements for achieving forensic readiness in WSNs. However, with the rapid
tendency towards the usage of efficient, low memory footprint and low power
devices in the industry, devices will be less likely to keep data stored in memory.
Therefore, similar forensic readiness frameworks that will be discussed in the
following sections must be developed for such devices in advance. Otherwise,
forensically crucial data can be easily lost forever.
In the next section we will discuss the challenges that investigators and practi-
tioners face when performing digital forensics procedures in both IoT and WSNs.
Although IoT and WSNs are different with respect to their structures, WSNs
are considered to be part of IoT (Christin et al., 2009; Mainetti et al., 2011; Li
and Xiong, 2013; Jiang et al., 2013), a concept of worldwide connected ubiqui-
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tous devices. The distinctions between two environments are not clearly pointed
by the research in the current literature and digital forensics efforts similarly
applied to both concepts, particularly research in IoT forensics are conducted
with WSN characteristics in mind. This makes some of the research efforts in
both environments inseparable from the digital forensics perspectives.
4.1 Challenges in IoT and WSN Forensics
In this section, we discuss the digital forensics challenges for IoT and WSN as
specified by Hegarty et al. (2014). Note that most of the challenges we discuss
in this section are applicable to both IoT and WSN.
Table 3: Potential evidence sources in IoT and WSN Environments (Oriwoh and
Sant, 2013)
Sources Example
Expected
evidence
Internal to
network
Hardware End
nodes
IoTware e.g. game consoles, fridges,
mobile devices, smart meters,
readers, tags, embedded systems,
heat controller
Sensor data e.g.
IP address, Rime
number, sensor ID
Network
Wired and Wireless, mobile
communications e.g. GSM, sensor
networks, HIDS, NIDS, HMS
Network, Logs
Perimeter
devices
AAA server, firewall, NAT server,
IDS, NIDS, HIDS
External
Cloud
Public, Private, Hybrid cloud
systems
Client Virtual
Machines; logs
Web
Web clients, webservers,
social networks
Web logs; user
activity
Hardware End
nodes
Mobile devices, sensor nodes
and networks
Sensor data e.g.
IP address, Rime
number, sensor ID
‘X’ Area
Networks
Home Area Networks (HAN) Network logs
Different Interfaces and Storage Units: The IoT devices that are used in
everyday life have different interfaces which allow users to use services or control
the devices. Example interfaces could be propriety software, mobile application,
hardware, or embedded firmware which provides an invisible interface. The vari-
ety of interfaces makes digital forensic investigation a tedious process as digital
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forensics tools do not automatically detect all types of interfaces, file systems
and even data itself. Similar issues arise when WSNs are the forensically targeted
environments. In addition to the variety of interfaces, IoT devices store data in
miscellany of storage units both volatile and non-volatile including internal and
external memory units (e.g. eMMC, eFlash, and DRAM) and cloud storage (e.g.
HDD and SSD) (Pereira et al., 2013). As for the sources of digital evidence,
Table 3 gives a broader view of where potential evidence may reside in an IoT
and WSN environment.
Differences in the interfaces and storage units causes investigators to perform
manual forensic methods on the devices if (at all) possible. This will also increase
the time required for the investigation as automated tools do not recognize pro-
priety interfaces. Another issue is that volatile data might be destroyed by the
device after they are used. In this case, data recovery may not be even possible.
In addition, data may also be destroyed due to the wear-leveling technology in
flash memory devices and solid state drives. Every memory cell has a certain
read/write lifetime which varies between 10000 and 100000 depending on the
manufacturer. Therefore, internal firmware in the memory will distribute data
stored in the memory to the unused (unallocated) cells in order to level memory
wearing in mostly used memory cells. In this case, previously deleted data will
be destroyed because unallocated space also consists of the memory cells that
has previously been used to store data but later deleted.
Fig. 4: Cloud forensic three-dimensional model (Ruan et al., 2011)
Furthermore, data stored in the cloud raises serious issues in digital forensics
investigations performed in IoT and WSN environment. In order to identify these
issues, Ruan et al. (2011) defines cloud forensics in three dimensions (see Fig.
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4). The two most important problems in cloud forensics that are also highly
related to IoT and WSN forensics are multi-tenancy and multi-jurisdiction.
Multi-tenancy allows cloud tenants to access the software instance simultane-
ously (Computing, 2010), therefore user ascription and ownership for specific
data become the investigators’ major concerns.
In order to provide efficient service availability and reduce the cost of services,
major cloud service providers such as Google, Amazon and HP locate their
data centers all around the world. Different countries and different states have
different jurisdictions. A crime in one jurisdiction may not be considered a crime
in another. In addition, law enforcement agencies having different jurisdictions
may not be willing to cooperate with each other. Due to all of these issues,
investigators may have to deal with multi-jurisdiction issues when data from
IoT and WSNs are stored in cloud.
Lack of Universal Standard for IoT and WSN Data Storage Due to the
characteristics of IoT/WSN data, it is extremely difficult to create a universal
standard for data storage. Nevertheless, there have been efforts to create frame-
works to provide a unified way to store data for IoT. Li et al. (2012) identify the
IoT data features as follows:
– Multi-source and Heterogeneity: IoT/WSN data is sampled by various
connected devices including Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) readers,
cameras, smart appliances, proximity, pressure, temperature, humidity, and
smoke sensors. The data collected from this vast category of devices have
significantly different semantics and structures.
– Huge scale: The IoT/WSN contains a large number of perception devices,
these devices’ continuously and automatically collect information leads to a
rapid expansion of data scale.
– Temporal-spatial correlation: As the data are constantly collected from
IoT/WSN, the data will consist both time and space attributes in order to
correlate them with respect to the changing location of device over time.
– Interoperability: IoT/WSN are currently evolving to achieve data-sharing
to facilitate collaborative work between different applications. For instance,
in the case of an on-road emergency, while the patient’s medical record is
securely shared with a nearest emergency center (Rabieh et al., 2018), the
data related to road conditions may be also assessed for timely arrival by an
autonomous car.
– Multi-dimensional: IoT application now integrates several sensors or WNSs
to simultaneously monitor a number of sensing devices, such as temperature,
humidity, light, pressure, and so on. And thus the sample data is usually
multidimensional.
The available methods and techniques are mostly limited and designed for a
certain set of technologies. For instance Li et al. (2012) have proposed a solu-
tion to the storage and management of IoT data named IOTMDB using NoSQL
(Not Only SQL). In addition to this work, Jiang et al. (2014) proposed a data
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storage framework to efficiently store big IoT data which is collected from the
deployed devices (WSNs) into storage units by combining and extending mul-
tiple databases and Hadoop (an open source framework that provides capabil-
ity of process and storage of large data sets). In addition, Gubbi et al. (2013)
introduced a conceptual IoT framework with Aneka cloud computing platform-
runtime platform and a framework for developing distributed applications on
the cloud (Manjrasoft, 2016)- being at the center. This framework integrates
ubiquitous sensors and various applications (e.g. surveillance, health monitoring
and critical infrastructure monitoring) using aforementioned cloud platform.
From the forensics investigation’s point of view, analysis of data coming
from different sources will be a serious challenge. The only way to deal with the
analysis of such heterogeneous data is to use Hexadecimal editors (a.k.a HEX
editors) as they allow reading the raw data from storage units. However, it will be
a tedious (if not infeasible with large scale data) process because of the amount
of data collected from IoT devices and WSNs.
Temporal-spatial correlation of IoT/WSN data may be useful for the in-
vestigators when data includes geolocation information (e.g., GPS coordinates)
readable by the tools used. However, IoT/WSN space can be defined of any
size and data may come with custom space information. This also needs to be
translated into intelligible data by the investigators as evidence.
Interoperability of the devices will be a serious challenge for forensics in-
vestigations as the data will be shared among the applications and the origin
of the data needs to be known to conclude the investigation. If the data being
operated by different applications is not traceable then accountability or non-
repudiation issues will be raised. For instance, it will be difficult to answer the
questions: What caused the operation failure? Was there any attack? What data
is produced by each application/device?
Devices have different levels of complexity, battery life/source As dis-
cussed earlier, IoT devices may vary depending on the duties they perform, how
often the device communicates, size of the data being transmitted, and avail-
able storage in the device (SiliconLabs, 2016). This variance is also reflected on
the complexity of devices. While the device may be as simple as a single sensor
collecting environmental values from animals’ habitats, it may also be complex
enough to consist of a processor, relatively large memory units, and commu-
nication protocols with security mechanisms (e.g., Internet refrigerator). In the
former, battery replacement will be impractical therefore battery life is expected
to outlive the animal (Chen, 2012). In the latter however, the device will need
to constantly consume power to be available for its service.
Complexity and battery life/source of the device affects digital forensics in-
vestigations from similar points of view as discussed above such as volatility
of data, availability of data, ownership and user ascription. For example, the
data in network and volatile memory disappears in a short amount of time, thus
recovery of such data is often impossible unless the device keeps logs of data.
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This requires existence of more non-volatile memory and processing power hence
larger battery.
Fig. 5: IoT Forensics (Zawoad and Hasan, 2015)
Availability of Propriety Operating Systems The operating systems (OS)
that are used for IoT was originally designed for WSNs such as TinyOS (Levis
et al., 2005), Contiki (Dunkels et al., 2004) and OpenEmbedded Linux (OpenEm-
bedded, 2017). However, with the advances in the development of more sophis-
ticated IoT devices than small sensors, the need for new OSs for IoT emerged.
Hence, RIOT (Baccelli et al., 2013) was developed to bridge the gap between
the available OSs for WSNs and the new needs for IoT. Recent development of
Android Things (Google, 2016a) also move this trend to another level to provide
leveraging the existing Android development tools, APIs and resources to build
an IoT environment. While Table 4 depicts the comparison of different OSs for
IoT and WSN, the details about these existing solutions can be obtained from
the given resources above. In Table 4, P means: Partial Support, N means: No
Support and Y means: Full Support for given points.
There has been digital forensics research on the protocols such as IPv6
(Nikkel, 2007; Kumar et al., 2014, 2016), 6LoWPAN (Perumal et al., 2015; Ku-
mar et al., 2016), and RPL (Kumar et al., 2016) that we mentioned in Table 4.
These research efforts mostly provide frameworks for forensic readiness of IoT
and WSNs. To the contrary of the availability of forensic readiness frameworks,
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Table 4: Comparison tables for different IoT and WSN Operating Systems and
supported protocols (Minerva et al., 2015)
OS
Min
RAM
Min
ROM
C
Support
C++
Support
Multi-
Threading
Modularity Real-Time
Contiki <2KB <30KB P N P P P
TinyOS <1kB <4kB N N P N N
RIOT ∼1.5kB ∼5kB Y Y Y Y Y
Linux ∼1MB ∼1MB Y Y Y Y P
OS IPv6 TCP 6LoWPAN RPL CoAP
Contiki Y P Y Y Y
TinyOS N P Y Y Y
RIOT Y Y Y P P
Linux Y Y Y Y N
wide variety of available protocols for both IoT and WSN creates a troublesome
investigative process and introduces a steep learning curve for forensic examin-
ers.
IoT forensics can be divided into three categories depending on where the
forensic data is located and the investigation can take place (see Fig. 5) (Zawoad
and Hasan, 2015). Specifically these are : 1) Device/Node; 2) Network where the
data is collected; and 3) Cloud where the data is stored. The forensic research
on WSNs is conducted at the first and second levels where sensor data is col-
lected and transfered, and the communication takes place. Next we explain each
category.
4.2 Device Level Investigation
IoT or WSNs deploy a variety of devices with certain characteristics. Typi-
cally these devices employ processing units, memory, communication module
and sensing modules. The richness of the set of such devices increased signifi-
cantly with the developments in micro electro-mechanical devices (Gaura and
Newman, 2006). Examples of devices include but is not limited to sensors, smart
phones, smart meters, smart thermostats, cameras, wearable devices, on-board
vehicle devices, RFIDs, smart watches, and drones.
Device level investigation is necessary when data needs to be collected from
the memory of a device in IoT/WSN. As discussed in Section 4.1, IoT/WSN
devices may have propriety interfaces and storage units. Although it creates a
burden on investigators in terms of longer investigation time and increased learn-
ing curve, evidence must be collected from these heterogeneous devices. Thus,
the current state of the research shows that there is a long way to standardize
the device level investigations for both IoT and WSNs environments. In this
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section, we explain general forensics techniques which are used when data is not
available through device’s interface. We then discuss some of the techniques used
to collect forensic data from specific devices and their memories.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) discussed differ-
ent digital forensics data acquisition techniques from mobile devices in “Guide-
lines on Mobile Device Forensics” (Ayers et al., 2013). They recommend perform-
ing the following acquisition methods: manual extraction, logical extraction, hex
dumping/JTAG, chip-off, micro read. Manual and logical acquisition methods
are usually available when devices provide user interface and are not locked,
password protected, and damaged. In the case of IoT devices (other than smart-
phones and tablets), it is mostly not the case. Therefore, investigators usually
perform hex dumping/JTAG and chip-off techniques (micro read is a special
technique and it is out of our scope).
When smartphones or tablets are the interests of the investigations, exam-
iners use state-of-art digital forensic tools such as Cellebrite UFED Physical
Analyzer, Paraben Device Seizure, XRY, and Oxygen Forensics for their data
acquisition and analysis. This is mainly because these devices come with a well
understood operating systems such as Android, iOS, or Windows. Therefore,
physical and logical acquisition is generally available to the investigators using
aforementioned toolkits. Although we discuss some data acquisition techniques
from mobile devices in this section, we do not elaborate more on the available
forensic toolkits.
Forensically related data from a mobile device’s main storage unit is typi-
cally available for acquisition, however volatile data acquisition could often be
challenging. Therefore, particular research interest from the mobile forensics
community emerged for volatile memory acquisition. Anderson (2008), Kolla´r
(2010), and Sylve et al. (2012) proposed early forensic volatile memory dumping
tools crash, fmem, and dmd respectively. The acquired data from these tools
is then analyzed using other available tools such as hex editors. As a more re-
cent research, Saltaformaggio et al. (2016) proposed an open source tool called
RetroScope which recovers multiple previous screens (from 3 to 11) from the
volatile memory of a smartphone using a spatial-temporal memory acquisition
technique. This technique shows that investigators can recover earlier content of
an application (e.g. Facebook, WhatsApp, and WeChat) after the data is not
available through conventional techniques and tools. This technique can also be
particularly effective when the investigators do not have access to the smart-
phone’s data storage due to being password protected. Another recent research
on volatile memory acquisition tool development for mobile devices is done by
Yang et al. (2016). The proposed tool, AMExtractor, collects volatile memory
from a wide variety of Android devices for forensic acquisition meaning with
high integrity.
Hex dumping/JTAG technique allows investigators to access the memory
content by connecting special cables to the provided pins on the device. This
is done by loading a firmware to the device’s memory which is then used to
access the information in the rest of the device memory. Fig. 6 shows the JTAG
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module attached to Samsung Galaxy S4 Active phone’s mainboard. Using the
connectors available on the module and forensic memory reading tools, data
from the phone’s memory can be easily accessed.
Fig. 6: JTAG module for Samsung Galaxy S4 Active smartphone
Chip-off is another technique used when phone data is not available due
to several reasons such as JTAG is not possible and phones being physically
broken, burned or locked. In such cases, investigators can physically remove the
flash memory from the device using chip-off technique. Although this techniques
is described for mobile phones, it can also be used pretty much for any IoT
device or a sensor in WSNs which stores data in flash memory (NAND, NOR,
OneNAND or eMMC) (Intelligence, 2016). It is also important to note that chip-
off techniques may damage the memory and may cause permanent data loss even
though all the precautions are taken (Swauger, 2012).
Chip-off is a delicate and challenging method of data acquisition, therefore it
requires extensive training in both electronic engineering and file system foren-
sics. After the memory is removed from the phone, investigators are able to
create binary image (bit-by-bit copy) of the removed memory. Fig. 7(a) shows
removed NAND flash memory from iPhone5c and Fig. 7(b) shows example of
how removed NAND chip is mirrored using a test board. Finally, Fig. 8 shows the
raw data acquired from the removed memory via chip programmer and reading
program.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Authors’ Instructions 17
(a) iPhone 5c with removed NAND (b) Test board for copying NAND chips
Fig. 7: Chip-off and NAND memory mirroring for iPhone 5c (both figures are
from (Skorobogatov, 2016))
Zaharis et al. (2010) propose an architecture which provides remote live foren-
sics protection and eliminates malicious code execution in WSNs using sand-
boxing methods. Using the proposed architecture, one may dump the volatile
memory from the sensor device. However, this architecture does not provide full
memory dump for analysis, instead it extracts data selectively due to power
efficiency constraints. The collected data is only used for verification of the in-
tegrity of the program that each sensor device is running. Nevertheless, this is
not considered complete forensics analysis of sensor device memory.
In order to close the gap discussed above, Kumar et al. (2014) propose an
architecture of memory extraction from devices that are used in both IoT and
WSNs environments. The main goal of this work is to investigate the extracted
data in order to determine the reasons which could have caused the security
breaches. This architecture is specifically designed to extract, analyze, and corre-
late forensic data for IPv6-based WNS devices which run Contiki (Dunkels et al.,
2004) operating system and is powered by 8051-based, 8-bit micro-controllers.
Contiki is a light-weight and open source operating system for IoT and WSN
devices. It is important to note that the analysis done by the authors is purely
hardware based and does not depend on WSN traffic analysis.
This work is divided into three steps which are extraction, analysis, and co-
relation. In the first step, a copy of memory is extracted from the device memory.
In the second step, the acquired data is analyzed in a fully automated fashion in
order to reduce investigation time. In the final step, a set of new data is looked
for by co-relating retrieved data from one device to another device in the case
of multiple devices being used in the network.
As wearable IoT devices are becoming part of our everyday life, especially
fitness trackers, they started to appear in the crime/incident scene and also
being used in court cases (Alba, 2016; Siegal, 2016; News4JAX, 2016). This
resulted in the need for forensic data collection from fitness trackers with different
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Fig. 8: Data acquired from iPhone 5c NAND via reading software (Skorobogatov,
2016)
interfaces. Cyr et al. (2014) have studied security analysis of Fitbit, a wearable
fitness device. Although they mostly focused on the security issues in both device
communication and mobile application, its importance is also negligible from the
digital forensics perspective. This is mainly because their methods can be used
by forensic investigators.
Fig. 9: The Fitbit system components: attack surface is partitioned into five
regions, (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) (Cyr et al., 2014)
Fig. 9 shows each component in Fitbit system when synchronization is per-
formed between a Fitbit device, mobile device or computer, and Fitbit cloud
service. This system is also partitioned into possible attack surfaces in the fig-
ure. In addition to security analysis, the same partitioning can also be used
for forensic investigation as well. The device’s memory can be extracted from
Fig. 9(a) and analyzed using JTAG or chip-off techniques, and a chip reading
software. Fig. 9(b) and Fig. 9(c) can be attacked to read communication between
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both devices shown in Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 9(c). Fitbit cloud data however, can be
retrieved using similar methods discussed later in Section 4.4.
In most of the wearable fitness devices, memory is packaged with waterproof
material. Therefore, it is impossible to physically access the memory without
destroying the packaging (see Fig. 10). Once the memory device is accessed,
then JTAG or chip-off can be used to retrieve raw data from the memory.
Fig. 10: Fitbit Flex teardown process (iFixit, 2016)
4.3 Network Level Investigation
In some applications, IoT devices or sensors form a network of collective sensing
and action. Therefore, in addition to device level data, there will be data col-
lected at the network level regarding the flow of data, routing and tracking of
lost packets. This IoT-related network may utilize one or more of the following
networks:
– Body Area Network (BAN),
– Personal Area Network (PAN),
– Home/Hospital Area Networks (HAN),
– Local Area Networks (LAN),
– Wide Area Networks (WAN),
– Cyber-Physical System (CPS).
For each type of network, there needs to be customized mechanisms to be able
to conduct cyber forensics after an incident. This forms a new form of research
area that is different from the existing traditional wired networks.
Regardless of which form of network is used, most of the data in networks
is volatile, and volatility of data causes serious issues in forensic investigations.
Most of the hardware used in networks record transmitted data itself or some
other information about that data in logs. These logs are indispensable to the
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forensic investigators as they may contain information which can eventually be
used as evidence.
Firewalls capture and record the information about network traffic and keep
the logs of events and transmitted data which goes through them while pre-
venting unauthorized access to the systems. Jahanbin et al. (2013) proposed a
design of autonomous intelligent multi-agent system in order to collect, examine
and analyze firewall logs, and report possible evidence related to an ongoing or
previous criminal activities in WSNs.
The proposed architecture is designed to be located between the firewall and
the end user, and it consists of three cognitive agents.
– The collector agent: This agent is used in collection step and responsible for
collection and processing of the firewall logs that are recorded for a given
WSN.
– The inspector agent: This agent is used in the inspection step and is respon-
sible for identification of suspicious events from the given log files. It is also
responsible for transmission of suspicious events to the next agent.
– The investigator agent: This agent is used in both investigation and notifi-
cation steps. In the investigation step, it examines the forwarded suspicious
event by the inspector agent and evaluates its effects and importance. It
eventually decides whether it is malicious or not. In the notification step,
the decisions are reported as security alerts to the security administrator in
details.
It must be noted that, in order to preserve forensic soundness, the firewall
logs must be checked for integrity purposes as users (either an administrator
or adversary) might alter the logs and destroy the evidence (intentionally or
unintentionally). All the agents mentioned above work on the exact copy of the
firewall log files and keep the originals as evidence in order to preserve integrity
and provide reproducibility of forensic evidence.
Although WSNs have received the attention of security researchers, digital
forensics research is still lacking in the discipline. In order to at least prepare
WSNs for forensics investigations, Mouton and Venter (2011a) proposed a digital
forensics readiness prototype in IEEE 802.15.4 WSNs. This prototype is designed
based on the description made by Tan (2001) who defines two digital forensics
readiness objectives as:
1. Maximizing an environment’s ability to collect credible digital evidence, and;
2. Minimizing the cost of forensics in an incident response.
Although Tan (2001)’s objectives are sufficient enough for general digital
forensics investigations, Mouton and Venter modified these objectives to be bet-
ter suited to WSNs. Their objectives are threefold and aim to perform the inves-
tigation in the shortest amount of time, spending the least amount of time, and
without causing disruptions in the network which may perform mission-critical
tasks Mouton and Venter (2011a). As digital forensics investigations require the
original source of evidence being protected against alterations, the last objective
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(a) A graphical representation of a wireless
sensor network (Mouton and Venter, 2009)
(b) A graphical representation of the net-
work layout with digital forensics readi-
ness implemented (Mouton and Venter,
2011a)
Fig. 11: Adding a digital forensics readiness layer to an existing Wireless Sensor
Network for digital evidence collection
is critical for forensic soundness. In order to avoid inadmissibility of evidence
and make the implementation of digital forensics readiness, the authors created
additional independent forensics WSN referred as fWSN (see Fig. 11(a)), along
with the original WSN referred as oWSN (see Fig. 11(b)).
Mouton and Venter also discuss the list of requirements (see Table 5) which
can be used as a preliminary approach and need to be considered in order to
implement digital forensics readiness in an IEEE 802.15.4 WSN environment.
Note that the first column in the table shows some important factors which
make WNSs environments unique and different from WLAN.
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Table 5: Requirements in order to achieve digital forensic readiness in a IEEE
802.15.4 WSN environment (Mouton and Venter, 2011b)
Factors Detailed requirement list
Communication Protocol 1. The fWSN ensures the collection of all data packets
by motes in the field utilizing a receipt acknowledgement
packet protocol.
2. In order to make sure that the data packets are not
changed, oWSN ’s broadcasting communication should
be intercepted.
3. All poWSN ossible communication that is originating
from oWSN.
Proof of Authenticity and
Integrity
4. While fWSN captures the data, the authenticity and
integrity of all the data packets should be preserved.
5. Authenticity and integrity of the captured data in the
fWSN should be preserved while they are being stored.
6. Verification on the authenticity and integrity of all the
data packets should be available when digital investiga-
tion takes place.
Time Stamping 7. The data packets should have a time stamp assigned to
them in order to preserve their authenticity and integrity.
8. The order of the captured packets should reflect the
correct sequence when compared to the data transmitted
from the original network.
Modification of the network
after deployment
9. It should be possible to implement the fWSN without
any alteration in the oWSN.
Protocol Data Packets 10. fWSN s operation should not be affected by the rout-
ing protocol or the network topology being used by
oWSN.
Radio Frequencies 11. The fWSN should be able to communicate on the
same radio frequencies that are available to the oWSN.
12. All communication within the fWSN should occur on
a frequency not utilized in the oWSN.
13. Data packet should be captured forensically by the
fWSN when an intruder WSN is in the area and commu-
nicates on a frequency that influences the oWSN.
Power Supply 14. In order to ensure that the fWSN captures all foren-
sically relevant packet, the fWSN should have at least
the same or a longer network lifetime than the oWSN
in terms of battery power. Also, the fWSN should not
increase power consumption in the oWSN.
Network Overhead 15. While intercepting communication, the oWSN should
be free of extra network overhead.
Data Integrity 16. The fWSN should by no means be able to influence
the oWSN or influence any sensory data transmitted
within the oWSN.
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In another work, (Triki et al., 2009) propose a solution to digital forensics
investigations when wormhole attacks take place in a WSN. This solution ulti-
mately aims to collect digital evidence, detect colluded nodes and reconstruct
the events which occurred during the wormhole attack which allows attackers to
transmit a packet from one point to another point in the network by creating
‘tunnels’ (see Fig. 12). This will allow attackers to distribute the packet to other
nodes from the second point in the network (see Arora et al. (2010) for attack
details).
Fig. 12: Wormhole Attack (Arora et al., 2010)
The proposed solution suggests creating a virtual network called observation
network which consists of a set of investigator nodes and base stations. The
nodes in this secondary network are called observers. Each observer has a limited
coverage and they are responsible for monitoring the communication between
observed nodes located in the sensing network (see architecture in Fig. 13).
Observers collect information about the suspicious nodes such as traffic between
nodes, routing path of data packets, and identity of those nodes. The aggregated
evidence data is then broadcast to base-stations.
Base stations are responsible for several activities which are defined in the
following two groups (Triki et al., 2009).
1. Sensing based activities such as:
– Analyzing collected data from sensors
– Creating decisions by correlating and filtering the data
– Transmitting configuration to sensors
– Activating sensors dynamically to reduce battery usage
2. Investigation based activities such as:
– Collecting forensic information about the observed nodes from observa-
tion network
– Analyzing, correlating and merging the evidence in order to determine
malicious nodes and rebuild the attack scenarios
– Communicating with observers about configuration of their locations
This proposed architecture is able to detect all types of wormhole attacks as
the observer nodes and the observation network is designed in such a way that
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Fig. 13: Proposed WSN architecture (Triki et al., 2009)
no observed nodes are left behind in the sensing network. In other words, all the
observed nodes are clustered into groups and each cluster is constantly observed
by observer nodes.
CyberForensics for CPS and SCADA. Recently, IoT has also started to be
deployed in control systems for actuation purposes which led to the concept of
CPS (Rajkumar et al., 2010; Khaitan and McCalley, 2015). In such systems, IoT
devices are involved in sensing, communicating and acting. The difference from
the above networks is that there are nodes which do actuation and thus this
creates another venue for forensics investigation. One form of CPS is in the area
of control systems for critical applications such as energy, transportation and
industry. In such systems, the network is referred to as Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) (Boyer, 2009) and failure or attacks in such systems
is crucial to be detected and investigated for the applications to sustain (Krutz,
2005). SCADA systems, are used for the collection and analysis of real-time data
from Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Most of the CPSes rely on computer
and control systems in order to provide reliable operations to safeguard the
infrastructure. Therefore, forensics analysis of SCADA/ICS systems has been
an important tool which was considered in some works. In the remainder of
this section, we also discuss these approaches as they relate to a network-level
investigation.
SCADA systems consists of a field site and control center. In the field site,
there are IoT devices which are considered as intelligent such as Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs) or Remote Terminal Units (RSUs). These are typi-
cally attached to physical processes such as thermostats, motors, and switches.
The control center is responsible for collecting data related to the state of field
instruments and interacting with the field sites. Components found at the con-
trol center typically consist of a Human Machine Interface (HMI), Historian and
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Master Terminal Unit (MTU). All of these are connected with a LAN that can
run various protocols including MODBUS Modbus (2004), DNP3 Clarke et al.
(2004), and Ethernet.
The information security vulnerabilities of ICS have been studied extensively,
and the vulnerable nature of these systems is well-known (Stouffer et al., 2011;
Patzlaff, 2013; Shahzad et al., 2014). However, in the case of a security incidents
(e.g., denial of service attacks), it is important to understand what the digital
forensics consequences of such an attack are? What procedures or protocols
are needed to be used during an investigation? What tools and techniques are
appropriate to be used by the investigator? Where can forensic data be collected
and how?
In the rest of this section, we discuss various research efforts aimed at assist-
ing SCADA forensics procedures by proposing tools, techniques and forensics
investigation models.
SCADA Live Forensics: SCADA is originally deployed to non-networked en-
vironments, therefore there has been a lack of security against Internet-based
threats and cyber-related forensics. Over time, there has been a huge increase in
the vulnerability of threats caused through connectivity allowing remote control
over the Internet. The attacks necessitated SCADA system a forensic investiga-
tion in order to understand the effects and cause of the intrusion. Taveras (2013)
focuses on detecting the abnormal changes of sensor reads, illegal penetrations,
failures, traffic over the communication channel and physical memory content
by creating a software application. The challenging issue is that the tool should
be developed in a way that it should have the minimal impact over the SCADA
resources during the data acquisition process.
The problem involved in this process is that SCADA systems should not be
turned off for data acquisition and analysis as it is being continuously opera-
tional. There has not been a single forensic tool to preserve the hardware and
software state of a system during investigation. Research continued to provide a
computing module to support the incident response and digital evidence collec-
tion process. Experiment is performed on the SCADA system by performing live
data acquisition and then performing subsequent offline analysis of the acquired
data.
Based on the live forensic analysis of the data collected from the SCADA
system, it is concluded that traditional information security mechanisms cannot
be applied directly as these systems cannot tolerate delays in performance which
eventually require a lot of memory to perform long processes. Thus, SCADA
systems should consider a special operating paradigm. This also paved the way
to improve the infrastructure of the systems and provide appropriate tools for
forensic analysis over interconnected SCADA systems.
Limitations of forensic analysis tools on SCADA systems: As Ahmed et al.
(2012) notes, currently available traditional digital forensics tools are not capable
of performing data analysis on SCADA systems. The main reason is that state-
of-the-art tools are designed to work on deterministic systems and devices such
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as hard disk drives, mobile phones, network traffic captures saved in pcap files.
However, SCADA systems generate propriety log data depending on the make
and model the hardware. As discussed above, investigators are in need of creating
new scripts for their own particular needs to overcome this issue. Hence, there
is an expectation from the research community and forensics tools developers
to design SCADA forensics tools or patch currently available tools in order to
respond to this demand.
Developing Forensics Investigation Models for SCADA: Once the vulnerabilities
and the possible attacks on the SCADA/ICS systems are analyzed, it is crucial
to perform forensically sound forensic analysis on SCADA/ICS. The current
literature shows some efforts of developing forensic analysis frameworks and
models.
Fig. 14: Cyber Forensics Model for SCADA/ICS by Stirland et al. (2014)
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Table 6: Forensic Toolkit Application to SCADA Systems
SCADA Device Phase Forensic Tool
Network
Phase 3 TCPDump
Phase 4 Network Miner, Wireshark, AlienVault
HMI
Phase 3
Write Blockers, FTK Imager, EnCase, Helix,
SHA-256/MD5 Hashing Tool
Phase 4 EnCase, XWays, Accessdata FTK, Volatility
PLC/RTU
Phase 3 Besope PLC Flashing Software
Phase 4 XWays
Engineering
Computer
Phase 3
Write Blockers, FTK Imager, EnCase, Helix,
SHA-256/MD5 Hashing Tool
Phase 4 EnCase, XWays, Accessdata FTK, Volatility
Database
Server
Phase 3
Write Blockers, FTK Imager, EnCase, Helix,
SHA-256/MD5 Hashing Tool
Phase 4 EnCase, XWays, Accessdata FTK, Volatility
OPC
Phase 3
Write Blockers, FTK Imager, EnCase, Helix,
SHA-256/MD5 Hashing Tool
Phase 4 EnCase, XWays, Accessdata FTK, Volatility
Historian
Phase 3
Write Blockers, FTK Imager, EnCase, Helix,
SHA-256/MD5 Hashing Tool
Phase 4 EnCase, XWays, Accessdata FTK, Volatility
One of the early frameworks is proposed by Wu et al. (2013). In addition to
this framework, Stirland et al. (2014) proposed a methodology to analyze the
problems involved in SCADA/ICS systems proposed (see Fig. 14). The authors in
this work particularly categorize a set of forensic toolkits (both commercial and
open source) to support each stage of an investigation and structure of the control
systems. The proposed methodology involves a clear process of investigation
which includes the following phases:
1. Identification and preparation of the requirements and the problem involved
in extracting the evidence.
2. Identifying data sources- this phase involves gathering the data from sources
and analyzing if the system supports the data sources.
3. Preservation, prioritizing and collection this phase works depending on the
priority of data and different data capturing techniques are involved to ensure
all devices are captured or not.
4. Examination and analysis- this phase involves in performing the analysis
depending on the data sources, methods and provides a timeline in preparing
the data and logs on it and allows to extract data.
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5. Reporting and presentation- this phase involves in providing a report to
all the details performed in the above phases including the outcome of the
analysis which also includes documentation of the further recommendations
for future study.
Security is of high importance for the control systems and there are many
recommendations for further improvements in incident response to support in-
vestigation and increase the level of complexity for attacking the systems by
attackers. It is concluded that the proposed methodology for developing a foren-
sics toolkit is considered based on the requirements of SCADA systems. Various
suggested tools are shown in Table 6. There are already existing tools which
support the elements of SCADA forensic investigation and further research and
progress in this area is needed in order to identify more evidence and artifacts.
Moreover, Ahmed et al. (2012) discuss the challenges for forensics investiga-
tors in SCADA systems and their potential solutions. In order to address some
of these unique challenges of SCADA forensics analysis, a recent framework was
proposed in (Eden et al., 2016). This framework aims at identifying necessary
steps for incident response as well. Fig. 15 shows the SCADA forensic incident
response model consisting of six main stages: 1) Prepare; 2) Detect; 3) Isolate;
4) Triage; 5) Respond; and 6) Report.
Fig. 15: Forensics Model for SCADA Systems
This proposed model suggests that the preparation phase must be performed
prior to incident the happening. In this first stage, an investigator must under-
stand the system’s architecture with respect to its configuration and hardware
devices used in the system. This step is crucial to the first responders to avoid
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complication when the recovery from an incident is time sensitive. In this stage,
it is made sure that all the hardware used in the system is well documented. In
addition to the system architecture, the forensics investigator is also expected
to know the SCADA system’s requirements with respect to availability of the
system. This is essential particularly if the system is mission critical and run-
ning states of a certain device must be preserved while the investigation is in
progress. Therefore, prior knowledge of system requirements play a critical role.
Finally, the investigator is also expected to understand potential attacks tar-
geting hardware, software and the communication stack of the SCADA system.
Such knowledge will allow the investigators to better perform in the following
phases.
In the second stage of the model, the investigator is expected to detect the
type of attack and potential infected areas in the system. This detection will be
performed based on the real-time data available in the system such as network
packages and log files. Once the type of attack has been determined, investigators
will be able to locate infected areas based on the behavior of the attack. As long
as the infected areas are detected, it will be easier to know the type of data in
the next stage.
The isolate stage is critical for the investigation with respect to the impor-
tance of SCADA system in the CPS. In most of cases, infected areas in the
network must be isolated so that further contamination and disruption to the
system can be avoided. The success of the isolation will be dependent on the
success of the detection of potential infected areas.
Despite the classical forensics investigations, triaging is different in SCADA
networks. Forensics investigators must identify the data sources in order to triage
the available data. This will also be dependent on the information (e.g., device
make, model, and serial number) provided in earlier stages, particularly prepa-
ration and detection stages. Once the data identification is performed, then data
sources ought to be prioritized with respect to the value, volatility and acces-
sibility of data. This will allow investigators to acquire as much evidence as
possible.
In the respond stage, investigators perform actual data acquisition from the
SCADA system (network) by using the priority list created in the previous
stage. As a rule of thumb, data must be acquired from the SCADA system
by using forensically sound tools and techniques. As discussed before, this will
prove the admissibility of evidence in a court of law (when needed). In order
to acquire data from various devices and network, aforementioned forensics ac-
quisition techniques can be used. Once the data acquisition is completed, then
analysis of data is performed using available forensics tools or by creating new
special scripts for unconventional data. Eventually, the aim is to find a forensics
artifact to be presented as evidence from the large set of unrelated system data.
Finally, similar to the traditional investigations, the reporting stage requires
investigators to document all the steps taken, tools used, evidence collected, and
challenges faced. When they are documented systematically, then the investi-
gator may create a timeline of events by reviewing the findings to support the
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evidence found and determine the source of an incident/attack. The final report
must comply with the chain of custody by providing validation and verification
of evidence found.
Our final discussion in this section is briefly on accurate modeling of the
SIEMENS S7 SCADA Protocol for intrusion detection and digital forensics using
real-life data. Siemens S7 is used in SCADA systems for communications between
a HMI and the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). In (Kleinmann and
Wool, 2014), Intrusion Detection system (IDS) model is designed for S7 networks
which analyzes the traffic to and from a specific PLC. A unique Deterministic
Finite Automata (DFA) is used to model the HMI-PLC channel traffic whether
it is highly periodic or not.
SCADA systems have its own strategy in analyzing the fault or malfunction.
In this paper, it is defined that the research based on traffic simulation has several
risks such as lack of realism which effects the use of SCADA systems. Three
different traces of datasets are collected in order to perform the experiments
which are collected at ICS facilities. The first S7 SCADA trace was collected
from a manufacturing plant where a single channel is observed between the HMI
and an S7 complaint VIPA PLC. Next two traces are collected from a water
treatment facility which has control over specific levels in tanks. A Wireshark
program is used to collect the traces with HMI running in background in the
operating system. Authors show that, based on the analysis of the traffic from
two ICS plants, some key semantics of the proprietary of S7 protocol can be
reverse engineered. It is also observed that previously developed Modbus showed
successful results in the same way DFA-based approach is very successful with
high accuracy and extremely low-false positive rates; IDs is further extremely
efficient which works at line speed to detect the anomalies.
4.4 Cloud Level Investigation
As discussed in the previous sections, forensic investigation in cloud environ-
ments has its own challenges such as multi-tenancy and multi-jurisdiction. Since
IoT devices have limited storage and computational resources, the actual data
is processed and stored in the cloud. This causes investigations being conducted
in the cloud environment especially when data in physical storage and network
does not result useful evidence. Hence, similar investigative challenges in the
cloud exist when forensic investigations in IoT are conducted. Although current
research efforts in IoT forensics are in their very early stages, there are some suc-
cessful models suggesting easier investigations in the cloud environment. In this
section we will specifically focus on IoT forensics investigation models proposed
for cloud environments.
According to Zawoad and Hasan (2015), the term IoT forensics was not
formally defined until they proposed forensics-aware model (see Fig. 16) for IoT
infrastructures called FAIoT. This model supports digital evidence collection and
analysis in the IoT environment by providing easiness and forensic soundness.
Such a model might also allow cloud service providers addressing the needs of
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law enforcement officers when a search warrant is obtained to collect data from
cloud environments.
Fig. 16: Proposed Model of IoT Forensics (Zawoad and Hasan, 2015)
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Secure Evidence Preservation Module: This module provides constant monitor-
ing of the registered devices for forensics evidence in the form of logs files or
data collected by sensors. If evidence is recognized, it is then stored in the ev-
idence repository. Evidence repository database is designed on top of Hadoop
Distributed File System (HDFS) in order to provide scalable and reliable data
processing of large data. The data kept in the database will be categorized based
on the IoT device and its owner in order to reduce multi-tenancy issues and avoid
commingling of data in cloud. (Zawoad and Hasan, 2015).
Secure Provenance Module: This module provides chain of custody for the evi-
dence stored and kept in the database. This is made possible by using provenance
aware file system (PASS) introduced by Muniswamy-Reddy et al. (2006). PASS
is a storage system which performs automated collection, management, stor-
age and search of provenance an object (Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2006). Secure
Provenance Module provides provenance record of evidence stored in provenance
database by using PASS.
Finally, investigators can access the evidence and its provenance record us-
ing proposed APIs which makes sure the confidentiality of evidence by using
encryption algorithms. In order for this to be possible, investigators need a Web
Server to access the requested data through the API.
In another work, Oriwoh and Sant (2013) propose a more specialized model
called Forensics Edge Management System (FEMS) which is specific to smart
home environments. FEMS is an automated system which can be integrated into
smart homes in order to perform initial forensic investigations while providing
basic security services (Oriwoh and Sant, 2013). Fig. 17 shows the architecture
of the FEMS and all the security and forensic services provided by FEMS.
Fig. 17: The FEMS Architecture (Oriwoh and Sant, 2013)
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Oriwoh and Sant also proposed a digital forensics framework called IoT Dig-
ital Forensics Framework (IDFF) (see Fig. 18). This framework presents step by
step operation presented in the flowchart in order to show how FEMS operation
is performed. As stated by the authors, usage of FEMS provides automatic, in-
telligent, and autonomous detection and investigation, and indicates the source
of security issues in smart homes to its users.
Fig. 18: Detailed flowchart of the IoT Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF) (Ori-
woh and Sant, 2013)
4.5 Future Research
As digital forensics in IoT and WSNs is a relatively new concept particularly for
the digital forensics community, the current research reveals important future
work to be conducted. It is quite obvious that newer investigative techniques will
be soon needed as Google has announced Android Things (Google, 2016a) a new
operating system to develop new IoT devices and there is a growing number of
IoT devices being deployed in our daily applications. It is worth noting that as
WSNs are now widely considered under the IoT concept, most of the endeavors
for digital forensics research will be also applicable for WSNs. In addition, digital
forensic solutions and frameworks also will be needed due to the availability of
low memory footprint and low power requirement devices used in WSNs.
Despite this inevitable demand in the very near future, once they are devel-
oped, these new methods will ultimately help investigators to perform standard
investigative processes. Until then, it could also be possible to use some of the
available tools and techniques that are readily available for current Android op-
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erating systems. In addition to the existing research literature, we believe some
of the areas for further work could be listed as follows:
– standardize data storage units and interfaces in similar devices. Forensically
valuable IoT devices (e.g. fitness trackers) could be designed and manufac-
tured with data storage units which can be analyzed using state of the art
forensic tools. Using known interfaces such as JTAG connections for IoT
devices is also critical for faster and reliable investigations.
– develop automated decision-making systems on forensically sound data for
specific IoT technologies such as smart homes. It is well known that artificial
intelligence techniques have been applied to many digital forensic domains
to intelligently automate duties performed by human entities. Therefore, as
an example, it can be very useful to adapt machine learning techniques to
classify evidence in IoT domain or expert systems can be used to create
intelligent tools to make decisions based on knowledge collected from both
investigators and IoT environments.
– build a model that would correlate evidence found in IoT environments.
Digital forensics evidence correlation is an important concept especially when
heterogeneous data is involved in investigations. Case et al. (2008) have
developed a framework for automatic evidence discovery and correlation from
a variety of forensic targets. We also believe that similar models can also be
built for IoT environments in order to use unrelated data leading to actual
evidence through correlation.
– analyze Android Things and develop new forensics models and tools for data
acquisition, examination, analysis and reporting. This brand new operating
system needs immediate attention from the researchers as it is projected to
be used in many IoT devices in the near future.
– create new digital forensics investigation models (e.g. Electronic Discovery
Reference Model, see http://www.edrm.net) for specific IoT environments.
Due to the heterogeneity of data and hardware in IoT devices, it could
be useful to develop IoT specific investigation models. Because, currently
available models are mostly designed for storage, network, and cloud specific,
however, IoT environments may necessitate all three environments being
used.
– collaborate with data analytics and fault-tolerance experts to cooperatively
analyze data from IoT devices not only related to user activity but also
related to hardware and embedded systems. This opens up opportunities
for insurance companies as they would like to investigate issues regarding
failures while some of these failures might be due to actual attacks from
external attackers.
– create robust and standard solutions particularly for live data acquisition,
automated data collection, recovery of memory and processes from live units
in SCADA systems.
– develop legal solutions to the issues including preservation of the chain of
custody and admissibility of IoT evidence. In digital investigations, it is crit-
ical to preserve chain of custody for evidence admissibility. However, it may
Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Authors’ Instructions 35
not be possible in IoT environments because of their designs. Involvement
in legislative processes regarding IoT forensics investigations is needed to
determine solutions from the legal aspects.
4.6 Conclusion
The IoT and WSNs offer a significant source of potential evidence, however due
to their heterogeneous nature and the ways in which data is distributed, aggre-
gated, and processed, there are challenges that the digital forensics investigations
must overcome. For this purpose, new techniques are required to not only over-
come the hurdles, but also influence the architecture and processes in order to
gain access to this rich source of potential evidence in the IoT and thus WSN
environments. In this book chapter, we explained digital forensics challenges in
IoT and WSN environments. We also analyzed and explained currently available
solutions to overcome some of those challenges from different perspectives. As
discussed in the Section 4.5, there are still many open research problems in this
new area.
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